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Bigelow Court indicated, however, that the fulcrum used in balanc-
ing governmental interests against those of advertising will favor the
government so that most of the regulation of advertising which was
sanctioned before Bigelow will remain intact. If this proves true in the
courts' post-Bigelow case-by-case considerations of advertisements, then
the first amendment status of advertising will not be any higher after
Bigelow than it was before. It appears that the rule allowing govern-
mental regulation of advertising will remain in force and that advertise-
ments receiving first amendment protection, such as the one involved in
Bigelow, will remain the exception to the rule.
HELEN L. WINSLOW
Criminal Law-Testing the Credibility of Search Warrant Affi-
davits
Relying upon the fourth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution', criminal defendants often attempt to suppress evidence being
offered against them by attacking the validity of the search warrant used
to obtain the evidence.' One method of challenging the warrant's
validity is by attacking the affidavit upon which its issuance was based.3
1. State court defendants actually rely on the fourth amendment as incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment by Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). References to the fourth amendment in this note are made
with this incorporation in mind.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
The United States Supreme Court has held that most searches may be made only
with a search warrant, the situation involved in this note. Warrantless searches have
been permitted only when officers come across evidence in "plain view," as in Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam); when the search is consented to;
where there are exigent circumstances, such as the possibility that evidence will be
destroyed or moved, as in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); or subsequent
to lawful arrest, as in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
When a search has been made with a warrant, possible issues are whether there was
probable cause for the warrant, whether the warrant was issued in accord with statutory
requirements, and whether it was executed properly.
3. Former section 15-26(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes required that
"(a]n affidavit signed under oath or affirmation by the affiant or affiants and indicating
the basis for the finding of probable cause must be a part of or attached to the warrant,"
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In two 1975 cases, however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
imposed a limitation on the permissible scope of such attacks. In State
v. Harris4 and State v. Brannon' the court held that defendants may
question the sufficiency, but not the veracity, of the allegations in the
affidavit. While that position is one that has been established in some
states for years, it is one of questionable validity since the United States
Supreme Court's 1961 decision of Mapp v. Ohio,0 which made the
exclusionary rule a requirement of the fourth amendment.
The issue arose in Harris during a pretrial hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence obtained with a search warrant.7  An officer obtained
the warrant to search the defendants' apartment for evidence of illegal
drugs. The affidavit he submitted to obtain the warrant stated that an
"informer who in the past has proven reliable by giving this detective
information that resulted in more than 2 arrests and convictions.. ,"
had told him that defendants had drugs in their possession.8 Defendants
attempted to question the officer about the two prior convictions. Ob-
jections to the questions were sustained, however.9
In Brannon defendant moved after trial to suppress evidence
gained from a search of his automobile. The evidence, a dog leash,10
had been obtained with a search warrant issued on the basis of a police
officer's affidavit statement that property used in the commission of a
crime had been located in defendant's automobile. The affidavit stated
that this allegation was based on "personal information" from a party
Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 869, § 8, [1969] N.C. Sess. Laws 975 (repealed 1973). New
statutes which went into effect July 1, 1975, contain a similar requirement. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-244 (1975).
4. 25 N.C. App. 404, 213 S.E.2d 414, appeal dismissed, 287 N.C. 666, 216 S.E.2d
909 (1975).
5. 25 N.C. App. 635, 214 S.E.2d 213, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 287 N.C.
665, 216 S.E.2d 908 (1975). This was the second time Brannon was before the court of
appeals. After the first trial of the case, the trial court held that the search warrant may
have been invalid, but said that the evidence could still be used at trial because it was
found in plain view and thus seizure was valid without a warrant. The court of appeals
ordered a new trial, however, holding that the trial court erred in failing to make
findings of fact showing that police officers were legally on the premises where the
evidence was found in plain view. State v. Brannon, 21 N.C. App. 464, 469, 204 S.E.2d
895, 899 (1974).
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. 25 N.C. App. at 405, 213 S.E.2d at 415.
8. Brief for Appellant at 4, 25 N.C. App. 404, 213 S.E.2d 414. The Supreme
Court held in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), that an affiant relying on
information from an unnamed informant must state: (1) underlying circumstances
showing reason to believe the informant is credible and (2) underlying circumstances
showing the basis of conclusions reached by the informant.
9. 25 N.C. App. at 405,213 S.E.2d at 415.
10. The defendant was charged with larceny of a dog under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
84 (1969). Brief for Appellee at 1, 25 N.C. App. 635, 214 S.E.2d 213.
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who had seen the property in question." In support of his post-trial
motion to suppress, defendant argued that testimony at trial showed that
the party referred to in the affidavit had not positively identified the
leash before it was obtained under the warrant.' 2 Nevertheless, his
motion to suppress was denied.' 3
The appeals court affirmed both lower court rulings without con-
sidering the validity of the suspicions about each affiant's credibility. It
also did not distinguish between Harris, in which defendant sought
information to challenge the veracity of the affidavit, and Brannon, in
which defendant claimed that he had evidence raising a question about
the affiant's veracity. Instead, the court decided both cases by adopting
the "majority rule" that when the search warrant is valid on its face and
the sworn allegations are sufficient to establish probable cause, a de-
fendant may not attack the validity of the allegations or the credibility of
the affiant or his informant in the voir dire hearing on the defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence seized by law enforcement officers.' 4
To explain its position the Harris court said:
[T]he magistrate considers and passes upon the alleged circum-
stances, the credibility of the informant and the credibility of the
affiant. The policy of the Fourth Amendment to protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures is adequately served by these
11. Brief for Appellant at 4, 25 N.C. App. 635, 214 S.E.2d 213.
12. Id. at 26. The defendant in Brannon also contended that the evidence obtained
with the search warrant should be suppressed because the party's identification referred
to in that affidavit came while police were making an illegal search. Id. at 29. The
court of appeals also held that this argument was not a valid basis for challenging a
search warrant, repeating its position in Harris that if a search warrant is sufficient on
its face, the validity of the allegations in the underlying affidavit cannot be attacked. 25
N.C. App. at 636-37, 214 S.E.2d at 215. The court's holding on this point raises a
constitutional question similar to that in the bar against attacks on an affiant's credibili-
ty. If evidence gained unconstitutionally cannot be used at trial, it seems to follow that
it also cannot be used indirectly to secure a search warrant. In fact, the Supreme Court
has said that the exclusionary rule not only prohibits such evidence from being used at
trial, but also from being used in any way. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Still, the issue apparently is one rarely faced by courts.
Generally, police who secure evidence unconstitutionally attempt to use it at trial, rather
than to secure a search warrant. No prior cases on the issue have been found.
13. 25 N.C. App. at 637, 214 S.E.2d at 215.
14. 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416. The court added, however, that:
This rule of law should not be so broadly interpreted as to infer that under
no circumstances can a defendant attack the validity of a search warrant which
is valid on its face, or valid when the affidavit is adequately supported by a
sworn statement. For example, one ground for attacking its validity is that
the magistrate failed to properly perform a judicial function in finding probable
cause, as in State v. Miller, 16 N.C. App. 1, 190 S.E.2d 888 (1972), modified,
282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353 (1973), where the magistrate issued the search
warrant without reading it.
25 N.C. App. at 407, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
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standards. To permit a defendant to challenge the truth or accu-
racy of the factual averments of the affidavit, or the credibility of
the informant or affiant, would open at trial an issue or issues,
theretofore judicially determined, collateral to that of guilt or in-
nocence. 15
The logic for distinguishing between attacks on the sufficiency of
allegations and attacks on the veracity of the affidavit was not explained.
The court of appeals has indicated elsewhere, however, that the basis for
its distinction is that a judge can determine the sufficiency by studying
the affidavit, but the determination of credibility requires a hearing with
testimony. 16
Both cases were appealed, but the North Carolina Supreme Court
dismissed the appeals without comment.
The limitation on a motion to suppress was not clearly established
in North Carolina before Harris and Brannon. The court cited a 1973
case, Siate v. Salem,'7 as precedent. In that case, the court refused to
require a police officer to answer questions about allegations he made in
an affidavit when the affidavit was attacked on a motion to suppress."8
That case may have been precedent for Harris, but two post-Salem
cases, State v. Wooten"0 and State v. Logan,20 contained language
contrary to the holding in Brannon. In both previous cases, the court
had rejected claims by defendant that during a voir dire hearing on a
motion to suppress evidence gained by a search warrant, the State
should produce witnesses to show that probable cause existed for the
search. The court held that the affidavit used to apply for the search
15. 25 N.C. App. at 406,213 S.E.2d at 416.
16. The court indicated this justification in State v. Salem, 17 N.C. App. 269, 193
S.E.2d 755 (1973), in which it refused to require a police officer to answer questions
about allegations he made in an affidavit when the affidavit was attacked on a motion to
suppress. The court said: "The affidavit was before the court and a voir dire hearing
was not required in order for the court to find that the facts contained therein were
sufficient to meet constitutional and statutory requirements." Id. at 274, 193 S.E.2d at
758.
17. 17 N.C. App. 269, 193 S.E.2d 755 (1973).
18. Even Salem was dubious precedent. In that case, the defendant apparently was
not trying to impeach a specific statement the police officer had made in his affidavit,
but rather to attack the officer's conclusion that the informer was credible. If Salem was
not on point, neither was the case that the court cited as precedent: State v. Shirley, 12
N.C. App. 440, 183 S.E.2d 880, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 729, 184 S.E.2d 885 (1971). The
issue in that case was whether the affidavit gave the magistrate sufficient basis on which
to judge the credibility of the informer relied on by the officer, not whether the
statements in the affidavit were accurate.
19. 20 N.C. App. 139, 201 S.E.2d 89 (1973), cert. denied, 284 N.C. 623, 202
S.E.2d 277 (1974).
20. 18 N.C. App. 557, 197 S.E.2d 238 (1973).
480 [Vol. 54
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warrant was a "sufficient showing."' 21 But the court also said that the
defendant, if he wished, could produce evidence himself to attack the
credibility of the facts stated or the motives of the officer who executed
the affidavit.2 2 Also, in a 1971 case,23 the court considered the merit of
a defendant's claim that a search warrant was based on hearsay, without
simply dismissing the inquiry as irrelevant.
The position taken in Harris and Brannon is well established
outside North Carolina. As the court noted in Harris,2 4 the majority of
courts that have considered the question have held that defendants may
not attack the veracity of search warrant affidavits. 25 Nevertheless, the
North Carolina court's decision to subscribe to the rule at this time is
surprising. Most courts that have adopted the no-attack rule did so
before 1961, the year in which the United States Supreme Court decided
Mapp v. Ohio.2" In that case, the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment not only included the fourth amendment's guarantee of
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, but also mandated
state enforcement of the rule requiring exclusion from trial of evidence
that was obtained by methods violating the fourth amendment.2 7
While some courts have defended the no-attack rule since Mapp,28
21. 20 N.C. App. at 141, 201 S.E.2d at 90. For similar language in Logan, see 18
N.C. App. at 558, 197 S.E.2d at 239.
22. 20 N.C. App. at 141, 201 S.E.2d at 90; 18 N.C. App. at 558, 197 S.E.2d at 240.
23. State v. Flowers, 12 N.C. App. 487, 183 S.E.2d 820, cert denied, 279 N.C. 885,
184 S.E.2d 885 (1971).
24. 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
25. See 5 A.LR.2d 394 (1949, Supp. 1971) and 68 AM. JUR. Search & Seizure § 66
(1973) for annotations indicating that most courts considering this issue have subscribed
to the no-attack rule. Prior to the 1960s, it appears that about the only dissent to the
rule came from federal courts which based their holdings on an interpretation of federal
rules. See 5 A.L.R.2d, supra, at 407-09 (1949). Although the situation has changed
since 1961, as this note will discuss, the no-attack rule probably still commands a
majority since most states considering the issue did so before 1961.
26. 367U.S. 643 (1961).
27. The Court had decided in 1914 that federal courts should abide by the
exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). And in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court had held that the fourteenth amendment
encompassed the "security of one's privacy ...which is at the core of the fourth
amendment." But the Court said then that the fourteenth and fourth amendments did
not require the state courts to enforce the exclusionary rule.
After Mapp, a 1963 case completed the implementation of the fourth amendment on
the state level. The Court held that the same standards of reasonableness and probable
cause governed both federal and state activities. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
28. They include Liberto v. State, 24 Ark. 350, 451 S.W.2d 464 (1970); State v.
Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, 309 A.2d 135 (1973); People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140,
258 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 888 (1970); State v. Lamp, 209 Kan. 453, 497
P.2d 275 (1972); State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So. 2d 98 (1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 911 (1972); Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 224 A.2d 111, cert. denied, 386 U.S.
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a significant number have argued that the Constitution requires review
of the credibility of affiants for the same reason the Supreme Court cited
in Mapp-to deter conduct that circumvents the fourth amendment.2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, held in favor of review
in 1970, because to hold otherwise "would permit the police in every
case to exaggerate or to expand on the facts given to the magistrate
merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement.""0
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, on the other hand, did not
mention Mapp in either of its decisions. In fact, in citing a 1949
annotation to support its argument in Harris, it indicated that it may not
have even fully considered it.'
Affiants who present erroneous information in applying for search
warrants clearly defeat the intention of the warrant requirement.32 The
fourth amendment states that warrants shall issue only upon probable
cause, and the Supreme Court has said that probable cause exists only
1024 (1966); State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1973); Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 399 S.W.2d 507 (1965).
29. They include McConnell v. State, 48 Ala. App. 523, 266 So. 2d 328, cert.
denied, 289 Ala. 746, 266 So. 2d 334 (1972); People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211
N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965); Henderson v. State, 490 P.2d 786 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971); Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 263 A.2d 441 (1970); and State
v. Hink, 6 Wash. App. 374, 492 P.2d 1053 (1972) on the state level and United States v.
Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 979 (7th
Cir. 1972); and United States v. Dunning, 425 F.2d 836 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1002 (1970) on the federal level.
Other federal courts have allowed inquiry but have not made it clear whether they
were doing so on constitutional grounds or, as some did before Mapp, on an interpreta-
tion of the federal rules. See, e.g., United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (10th Cir.
1972); United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966).
The number of dissenters since 1961 is significant for two reasons. First, there
appear to be almost as many dissenters from as supporters of the majority rule. In
addition, before Mapp, there apparently was no dissent from the rule on constitutional
grounds.
30. Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 337, 263 A.2d 441, 444 (1970).
31. The court cited 5 A.L.R.2d 394 (1949). 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at
416. It is also interesting to note that the court's reasoning was reminiscent of the
reasoning given by the courts before Mapp. One commentator, summing up the
reasoning of the no-attack cases, stated:
Their basic premise is that in issuing a warrant, the magistrate determines the
truth of the allegations. Holding this determination unreviewable supposedly
protects the solemnity of the warrant-issuing procedure; it has been contended
that a shift of final responsibility from the magistrate to the trial judge would
reduce the function of the magistrate to a formality. Moreover, it is argued
that an attack upon the truth of an affidavit at the trial may cause the issue
of the defendant's guilt to be confused with that of an affiant's perjury. It is
claimed that affiants will not lie because to do so would be perjury.
Note, Testing the Factual Basis for a Search Warrant, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1529, 1530
(1967).
32. The North Carolina court seemed to recognize this by its statement that
magistrates must review credibility. 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 414.
1976] SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS 483
where "the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and
of which he has reasonably trustworthy information" present sufficient
justification.33 Thus, allegations going beyond such information do not
establish probable cause. 4
Other methods might be used to punish affiants who make false or
misleading allegations,35 but the Supreme Court recognized in Mapp
that the only effective, available way to deter conduct is to remove the
incentive for it by preventing it from resulting in prosecution.3" The
issue presented by Harris and Brannon, then, is whether a magistrate's
hearing accomplishes this purpose. The North Carolina court may have
been suggesting that it does." Proponents of review have concluded,
however, that unless courts review the credibility of allegations that led
to the issuance of a search warrant, "the warrant requirement embodied
in the fourth amendment [will be] open to circumvention by overzeal-
ous officials willing to make erroneous affidavits in the hope that the
33. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). See also Dumbra v. United
States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925), in which the Court said:
In determining what is probable cause .... [w]e are concerned only with
the question of whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his
affidavit ... for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises
to be searched; and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that
a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was
a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issu-
ance of the warrant.
Id. at 441.
One commentator has suggested that the Court, by singling out the requirement
that the affiant had "reasonable grounds at the time of the affidavit" for his allegations,
settled the question dealt with here. The commentator notes, however, that courts have
not read Dumbra that way. Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a
Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REv. 825, 827 (1971).
34. One court expressed this idea by saying:
[I]t is now well established that a magistrate may not constitutionally issue
a search warrant until he is furnished with information sufficient to persuade
a reasonable man that probable cause for a search warrant exists. The purpose
of requiring this information is to give the magistrate the opportunity of know-
ing and weighing the facts and determining objectively for himself the need
for invading the privacy in order to enforce the law.
Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 337-38, 263 A.2d 441, 444 (1970) (citations
omitted).
The court said that when a magistrate rules on false information, he is precluded
from making the "detached and objective" determination contemplated by the Constitu-
tion. Id.
35. One court has stated, for example, that an affiant could be prosecuted for per-
jury. People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 258 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 888
(1970). For a rebuttal to the effectiveness of this as a deterrent, see the dissent of
Justice Murphy in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949).
36. 367U.S.at656.
37. The court may have meant this when it said, 'The policy of the Fourth
Amendment to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures is adequately served
by" the magistrate's review. 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
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resultant search or arrest will yield conclusive proof of criminal con-
duct."38
The pro-review courts appear to have a strong argument. The
Harris court said that it would permit a defendant to show that a
magistrate did not perform his job properly.3 9 That may respond to
arguments that magistrates often rubber-stamp warrant applications,
giving the affiant and his affidavit only a passing glance. 40  But it is
difficult to see how a magistrate who performs his job properly can
effectively judge credibility when he makes his decision in the context of
an ex parte proceeding. It is also difficult to picture circumstances in
which a magistrate would even doubt an affiant's testimony. The usual
affiant is a police officer, and a justifiable presumption would be that a
law enforcement officer giving sworn testimony is telling the truth."1
Further, in some cases, later evidence has demonstrated that a search
warrant has been issued on the basis of a false affidavit, despite a
magistrate's review."
Harris and other post-Mapp cases supporting the no-attack rule
have not refuted these arguments,4 3 nor have they provided other
grounds for defending the constitutionality of the no-attack rule.4 4 Some
courts4 5 have cited language in a 1967 Supreme Court case, McCray v.
38. United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. See note 14 supra.
40. Still, the defendant's brief in Harris indicated that the magistrate in that case
had not made more than cursory review of the affidavit:
[TThe magistrate first swore Officer Tripp to the affidavit after which he
swore Officer Tripp to the warrant and after reading the warrant and the affi-
davit and without any interrogation of the affiant, Tripp, and after reading the
affidavit, felt that the affidavit stated facts sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause for the search of the premises.
Brief for Appellant at 4, 25 N.C. App. 404, 213 S.E.2d 414.
41. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967), in which the Supreme Court
said that there is nothing in the due process clause requiring a judge to assume that every
police officer is committing perjury.
42. Brannon may be one example. After the first trial of the case, the trial judge
commented that the search warrant was probably invalid "because it seems to be based
on information contained in the affidavit that at least one of the state's witnesses swears
was not true." Record at 36,21 N.C. App. 464, 204 S.E.2d 895.
43. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 224 A.2d 111, cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1024 (1966), where the court simply dismissed arguments that Mapp required reversal of
its position against attacks on credibility without any discussion of the reasons for its
decision.
44. Since Mapp, the objection to opening a trial to issues collateral to that of guilt
or innocence is clearly not sufficient. To comply with Mapp, courts must hold hearings
to determine whether evidence gained from searches without warrants should be admit-
ted.
45. State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, -, 309 A.2d 135, 146 (1973);
People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 145, 258 N.E.2d 341, 344, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 888
(1970).
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Illinois,"6 in which the Court indicated approval of another court's
statement that the fourth amendment is served if a magistrate is trusted
to evaluate the credibility of an affiant in an ex parte hearing.4 7 But
the issue in McCray was not whether inquiry should be made into
the credibility of an affiant (in fact, extensive inquiry had been made),
and it is doubtful whether the Court meant to be addressing that point
at all.4" In fact, the United States Supreme Court has never ruled
directly on this issue.49
46. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
47. The Court was discussing the rule developed by some courts that in a hearing
to determine whether probable cause had existed for a search, a trial judge could
determine for himself whether police officers should be required to disclose an inform-
ant's identity. The Court said that "the reasoning of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in judicially adopting the rule was instructive," then proceeded to quote at length from
the court's reasoning:
"The Fourth Amendment is served if a judicial mind passes upon the existence
of probable cause. Where the issue is submitted upon an application for a war-
rant, the magistrate is trusted to evaluate the credibility of the affiant in an
ex parte proceeding. As we have said, the magistrate is concerned, not with
whether the informant lied, but with whether the affiant is truthful in his reci-
tation of what he was told. If the magistrate doubts the credibility of the affi-
ant, he may require that the informant be identified or even produced. It
seems to us that the same approach is equally sufficient where the search was
without a warrant, that is to say, that it should rest entirely with the judge
who hears the motion to suppress to decide whether he needs such disclosure
as to the informant in order to decide whether the officer is a believable wit-
ness."
386 U.S. at 307-08, quoting State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 385-88, 201 A.2d 39, 43-45
(1964).
48. McCray dealt with the validity of a search made pursuant to an arrest. In
order for the search to be lawful, the arrest had to be justified. Officers testified that
they made the arrest on the basis of information from an informant, but they refused to
give the name and address of that informant. The Court upheld a lower court's decision
to allow them to keep the identity of the informant secret, saying: "The arresting officers
in this case testified, in open court, fully and in precise detail as to what the informer
told them and as to why they had reason to believe his information was trustworthy.
Each officer was under oath. Each was subjected to searching cross-examination .
386 U.S. at 313.
Thus, inquiry had been made into the officers' credibility and the Court seemed
impressed that the officers had been cross-examined, something which does not occur at
an ex parte hearing.
49. The Court referred to the issue in 1964, but then did not decide it. Instead, the
Court assumed for the purposes of the case that such an attack may be made and went
on to conclude that even so, the search in that case had been valid. Rugendorf v. United
States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964).
Several cases dealing with the issue have been appealed to the Supreme Court. In
fact, a North Carolina case on the issue, one decided in federal court, reached the
Supreme Court in 1974. North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973 (1974). The Court
has refused to hear all of the appeals, however, although two justices, Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White, urged in Wrenn that it was time to resolve the question. Id. at
976.
In the end, the Court may uphold the no-attack rule by backing off from Mapp.
Some members of the Court have indicated displeasure with Mapp. See Justice Burger's
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and Justice
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If the Constitution does require something more than the no-attack
rule of Harris and Brannon, however, it might not require the other
extreme-that courts allow all defendants such as those in Harris the
right to question the affiant and, possibly, his informant, to probe for
evidence on the issue of credibility. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized the validity of a presumption in favor of an officer's
reliability50 and also has said that the decision of a magistrate should be
paid great respect.5 Thus, a court may be justified in requiring a
defendant to make an initial showing of a basis for questioning the
affiant's credibility before granting him a hearing.5 2  And the Court
said in McCray that judges may decide for themselves whether an
affiant should have the right to know the identity of, and thus question,
the affiant's informant.5"
In addition, all errors would not necessarily invalidate a search
warrant. The strongest case exists for suppression of intentional misre-
presentations. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has argued, the
"fullest deterrent sanctions of the exclusionary rule should be applied to
such serious and deliberate government wrongdoing . . . ," even to the
extent of invalidating a warrant for deliberate, non-material errors.54
Completely innocent misrepresentations would probably not be
sufficient, for the reasons given by the Seventh Circuit:
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule is to deter police
misconduct and good faith errors cannot be deterred. Further-
Harlan's dissent in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court has
already evidenced this mood by holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
evidence introduced before grand juries. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1973).
50. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967).
51. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
52. The Second Circuit has agreed with this:
The interposition of an "independent judicial officer, whose decision, not that
of the police, [will] govern whether liberty or privacy is to be invaded," . . .
goes a long way toward accomplishing the objectives of the Fourth Amend-
ment. True, the objectives are not accomplished if the judicial officer is put
upon by the police. But it is the responsibility of such officers . . . to see
to it that they are not deceived. The exclusionary rule, as applied in Fourth
Amendment cases, is a blunt instrument, conferring an altogether dispropor-
tionate reward not so much in the interests of the defendant as in that of soci-
ety at large. If a choice must be made between a rule requiring a hearing on
the truth of the affidavit in every case even though no ground for suspicion
has been suggested and another which takes care of the overwhelming bulk of
the cases, the policies of the Fourth Amendment will be adequately served by
the latter even though a rare false affidavit may occasionally slip by.
United States v. Dunning, 425 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002
(1970).
53. 386 U.S. at 313.
54. United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 1972).
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more, such errors do not negate probable cause. If an agent rea-
sonably believes facts which on their face indicate that a crime has
probably 'been committed, then even if mistaken, he has probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed.y5
Negligent and reckless misrepresentations might be deterable.50
Even so, several courts have argued that if the misrepresentation is
immaterial, it did not affect the issuance of the search warrant and
consequently, there is no justification for suppressing the evidence. 5
There is Supreme Court authority in support of this position."'
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a procedure that implements the
above reasoning. That court has held that to be entitled to a hearing on
the credibility of a search warrant or affidavit, a defendant must make a
showing of an error that was either committed with an intent to deceive
the magistrate, whether or not material to the showing of probable
cause, or made non-intentionally but was material to the establishment
of probable cause. "9 The Seventh Circuit has not precisely defined the
nature of the "showing" required, but clearly the defendant must
produce something that at least raises a doubt in the judge's mind. Once
a hearing is granted, a defendant will be granted his motion to suppress
if the trial court finds that the government agent was intentionally
untruthful about an allegation or recklessly untruthful about material
issues."
55. Id. at 988-89.
One court has indicated, though, that it would apply the exclusionary rule to
innocent, material errors. In United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1973), the
Fifth Circuit said:
The warrant procedure operates on the assumption that statements in the affi-
davit presented to the issuing magistrate are at least an accurate representation
of what the affiant knows though possibly inadequate to show probable cause.
It would quickly deteriorate into a meaningless formality were we to approve
searches and seizures based on misrepresentative or incorrect factual state-
ments. Thus, when an affidavit contains inaccurate statements which mate-
rially affect its showing of probable cause, any warrant based upon it is
rendered invalid.
Id. at 662.
56. The Seventh Circuit has argued, however, that it would be too difficult to
ascertain whether an error had been negligently or innocently made. Thus, the court
concluded that a motion to suppress should be granted only upon a finding of at least
reckless conduct. United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 979, 989 (7th Cir. 1972).
57. See United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966); State v.
Hink, 6 Wash. App. 374,492 P.2d 1053 (1972).
58. In Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1974), discussed in note 49
supra, the Supreme Court upheld the search warrant on the grounds that any errors were
not material to the finding of probable cause.
59. 489 F.2d at 988.
60. Id.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals indicated in Harris and
Brannon that a concern for opening a trial to issues "collateral to that of
guilt or innocence" of a defendant led it to adopt the rule against attacks
on credibility. 61 If that was its concern, the court should consider a
procedure such as the one followed in the Seventh Circuit, instead of
adopting the absolute rule against attacks on credibility. In most cases,
the court would accomplish its objective of avoiding a hearing on
collateral issues. Few defendants would pass the initial showing obsta-
cle, particularly in cases in which the court found no cause for requiring
police officers to disclose the identity of their informants. -02  Meanwhile,
the court would be following a procedure more in line with the constitu-
tional policies put forth by Mapp by granting review of credibility in the
most flagrant situations.
NANCY BENTSON ESSEX
Securities Regulation-Vicarious Liability For Securities Acts Vi-
olations-By Common Law or By Statute?
Congress regulated a variety of activities relating to the distribution
and trading of securities in the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. -  Each of these acts contains a provision
whereby one in "control"' of an individual who violates the acts' provi-
sions may also be held liable for the violation.4 This liability, however,
61. The court indicated this when it said: "To permit a defendant to challenge the
truth or accuracy of the factual averments of the affidavit, would open at trial an issue or
issues, theretofore judicially determined, collateral to that of guilt or innocence." 25
N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
62. One court has argued that the initial showing requirement would not cut down
on the number of pretrial hearings. State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, -, 309
A.2d 135, 146 (1973). As long as the court required something more than mere
allegations to constitute a "showing," however, it would seem the threshold obstacle
would be a barrier to some and probably to most defendants.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
2. Id. §§ 78a-hh.
3. "Control" is an intentionally undefined term. The framers of the Securities
Exchange Act commented on its meaning: "It was thought undesirable to attempt to
define the term. It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the
many ways in which actual control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods
used are stock ownership, lease, contract and agency." H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 26 (1934).
4. Section 15 of the 1933 Act provides:
